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ABSTRACT
Tapp, Kristy Marie. M.S. The University of Memphis. May 2010. Cognitive
Cruise Control: Investigating how Context affects the Momentum of Cognitive Control.
Major Professor: Rick Dale, Ph.D.
In the present studies a coordination dynamics perspective is taken to explore the
interplay of perception and action in a continuous dual-task paradigm. Two experiments
will be conducted using an action-dynamics methodology, through tracking response
trajectories with the Nintendo Wii remote, which allows for analysis of how a response
unfolds over time. The real-time data (i.e., the response trajectories) are expected to
reflect an intriguing pattern of cognitive competition as attention adapts to trial context.
The purpose of this work is twofold: a) exploring whether attention/cognitive control is
best characterized in terms of its structural limitations (i.e., bottleneck) or its flexible,
dynamic properties and, b) investigate if any patterns emerge in the response trajectories
that may be indicative of the cognitive system adjusting to conform to the unique
combination of experimental parameters.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Every decision we make, whether it is determining which job to apply for
or just deciding to pick up a cup of coffee, is possible because the cognitive
system coordinates the processing of the numerous stimuli we are constantly
bombarded with, giving rise to complex nested bouts of perception and action
(Kelso, 2002; Van Orden, Holden, & Turvey, 2003). Information processing and
ultimately higher-level cognitive processes never occur within a vacuum but are
instead modulated by numerous factors such as context and current goals. In order
to make any decision and subsequently act on it, the cognitive system must settle
on a current goal, reconcile the competition among seemingly countless stimuli,
and elect to initiate an appropriate response. All the while it must be flexible
enough to inhibit unexpected distractors, such as a dog jumping into your lap as
you reach for that coffee.
Historically, attempts to formulate theories of such cognitive control have
focused on explaining dual-task limitations of the cognitive system. The classic
theories, most notably the cognitive bottleneck theory (CBT), were built on the
single key assumption that the cognitive system conducts processing through an
assembly line of discrete, serial stages (for recent discussion see: Brisson &
Jolicoeur, 2007; Jentzsch, Leuthold, & Ulrich, 2007; Johnston & McCann, 2006;
Sigman & Dehaene, 2006; Vachon & Tremblay, 2006). The CBT has been shown
to predict responding in natural decision competition situations (Levy, Pashler, &
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Boer, 2006), but it originally sought to describe the pattern of results elicited by
the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm (Welford, 1952). In the
typical PRP design, participants are presented with two stimuli separated by
varying stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs). Responding to the two stimuli
typically requires arbitrary key presses in response to different tasks, from
relatively low-level perceptual decisions (Johnston & McCann, 2006), to higherlevel cognitive decisions such as numeral identification (Sigman & Dehaene,
2008). The common finding is that if the second stimulus (S2) is presented within
300 ms of the first stimulus (S1), the response to S2 is delayed (Sigman &
Dehaene, 2008). Moreover, the reaction time to S2 is longer in PRP experiments
than if it were to be completed in isolation.
The CBT posits that information processing resulting in a response
requires three discrete stages. The first stage is responsible for perceptual
processing, the second stage consists of central operations (e.g., linking of
stimulus-response mappings), and the third stage deals with the motor response.
According to the CBT the first and third stages can proceed in parallel. However,
a passive first-come, first-served serial processor characterizes the second stage.
Therefore, while the central stage is processing S1 all other stimuli must wait.
This deferment of access to the central stage of processing is thought to be the
cause of delayed response times to S2. Therefore, past research has shown that the
CBT is a powerful explanation of the common dual-task limitations, such as the
PRP effect (Shin, Cho, Lien, & Proctor, 2007).
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However, studies on decision-making and motor programming (e.g., Gold
& Shadlen, 2000, 2001, 2003) bring to light the possibility that the basic
assumption of serial, discrete-stage theories, which portray the cognitive system
as an assembly line, cannot wholly account for how the underlying neural
substrate operates. For example, Gold and Shadlen (2000) demonstrate that
decisions are based on continuously accumulating information, potentially all the
way into premotor regions dedicated to enacting a decision (see also Spivey, 2007
for a review of diverse evidence of this). Thus, accounts of information
processing should incorporate the notion that the cognitive system is built upon an
interconnected network of subsystems that perform their individual duties under
the influence of uninterrupted updates from the constituent parts of the whole
system.
One such approach is coordination dynamics (Kelso, 1984). Viewed from
this perspective, processing limitations seen in dual-tasking situations occur from
a number of dynamic interactions across the cognitive system. It may not be the
case that a single iron gate stands between perceptual processing and central (i.e.,
decisional/response-selection) stages of processing, where stimuli line up in a
single-file line waiting for their turn to pass in a first-come, first-served fashion,
presumably forming the infamous cognitive bottleneck. Moreover, processing a
perceptual event and responding to it is a complex task that entails many subtasks,
which includes but is not limited to: a) integration of the object’s features, b)
perceptual categorization, c) establishing an episodic memory trace of the object,

3

d) identification of the object, e) retrieving possible relevant information about the
object from long-term memory, f) integrating bottom-up and top-down
components, g) calling upon the relevant task/goal information, h) mapping the
object to an appropriate response, i) developing the intention to act, j) planning
the movement, k) initiating the response, and l) controlling the act of responding.
The mechanisms responsible for each subtask of the process do not exist in their
own discrete stage per se, instead moving from one component to another is a
graded process. The underlying mechanisms responsible for each aspect in the
sequence of events that results in information processing are continuously
receiving information from and influencing each other. In this way, information
processing is an autonomous self-organizing and highly flexible phenomenon.
Furthermore, although each individual mechanism has capacity limitations, not all
mechanisms reach maximum capacity on a predetermined timescale or at a single
step in the process. Therefore, at any moment in time a variable number of these
mechanisms can perform in parallel while others, which may have reached their
capacity limits, operate in a more serial manner.
Importantly, taking a coordination dynamics approach provides an
explanation for why authors have found conflicting evidence for the number and
loci of information processing bottlenecks. Sigman and Deheane (2006) are just
one example of the many researchers whose results support a single bottleneck at
the response-selection stage of processing, while Johnston and McCann’s (2006)
findings indicated a bottleneck closer to the perceptual processing stage. DeJong
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(1993) suggested multiple bottlenecks including a response initiation bottleneck
and a response-selection bottleneck that could also be congested by perceptual
categorization. It may be that they are all correct. The coordination dynamics
perspective suggests that information processing flexibly conforms to aspects of
the task at hand by altering the way in which the cognitive system controls how
processing resources are divided and shared. For example, if a student is
answering a quantitative question on a test (e.g., GRE, ACT), the cognitive
system may construct an information processing structure that tends to operate in
a more serial manner, focusing most of its resources on a single task at a time. On
the other hand, when driving, the cognitive system allows the driver to handle the
complex task(s) of driving as well as talking on a cell phone, while still
monitoring the environment for unexpected events, such as a child running out
into the street.
Broadly speaking, the purpose of the current work is to investigate
cognitive control in an experimental dual-task paradigm. Specifically, how
attention changes the way it processes information within varying perceptual
contexts by surveying the process of dynamic, coordinated cognitive control as it
unfolds over time. In what follows, a few pertinent models that provide theoretical
links between the classic structural bottleneck theory and coordination dynamics
are reviewed. Then, action dynamics and an introduction to the novel
methodology presently employed for collecting real-time, dual-task cognitive
control are briefly described. Finally, two exploratory experiments are presented.
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Competition for Processing Resources
Neural dynamic approaches to vision and attention, such as Desimone and
Duncan’s (1995) biased-competition model of visual attention posit a dynamic,
active process, which opposes the long-standing theoretical construct of the
attentional spotlight (Treisman, 1982). Instead of a central executive directing
attention around the visual field, their biased-competition model purports that
attention is an end result of settling competition within the cognitive system.
Desimone and Duncan (1995) suggest that the cognitive system is confronted
with competition numerous times between stimulus presentation and the motor
response to that stimulus. As each stage of visual processing is traversed the
processing becomes more complex and the amount of the visual field a neuron is
responsible for increases. As the neurons (i.e., “processing resources”) become
responsible for processing larger areas of the visual field, those areas must
compete with each other for the processing resources. This competition is
resolved by means of a biasing attentional template (i.e., working memory) that
monitors task-relevant information. Whichever stimulus wins the competition for
the limited processing resources is the stimulus that can be consciously reported
and responded to.
Potter, Straub, and O’Connor (2002) have proposed a discrete-stage theory
of information processing in dual-task situations, which incorporates the cognitive
competition seen in Desimone and Duncan’s (1995) model, that sought to explain
dual-task limitations in the attentional blink (AB) paradigm. Their model, termed
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the two-stage competition model, suggests that there are two levels of central
processing. In the first, all presented stimuli are processed on a preliminary basis.
This initial processing “scans” the stimuli for characteristics that match a stored
representation of task-relevant information. If the “scan” reveals that a stimulus
does have these features, that stimulus will begin to attract processing resources to
itself. Once a certain threshold is met, the stimulus then enters the second level,
which is a limited capacity stage that is responsible for classic central processing
tasks (i.e., stimulus-response mapping). It may be reasonable to postulate that
Potter et al.’s theory is similar to Treisman’s (1982) attenuation model. However,
the attenuation model only deals with processing information in the order that it is
received, as does the classic bottleneck theory. In Potter et al.’s model, the order
in which a stimulus enters a limited capacity stage of processing is active and
dynamic. For example, if S2 is presented before S1 enters the second level of
central processing and the initial “scan” of S2 finds task-relevant features, the two
stimuli will compete for the limited processing resources. The stimulus that enters
the second level first does so because it has attracted sufficient resources first. The
notion that a subsequently presented stimulus can “pull” processing resources
away from a previously presented stimulus will serve as a principle theoretical
question in the present studies.
Integration of Perception and Action
As previously mentioned, coordination dynamics proposes that cognition
arises from how information in the form of raw sensations percolate through the

7

brain. Individual neurons begin to process that information by activating networks
that begin to autonomously organize by coupling or decoupling until a unique
structure materializes for each perceptual experience. The interaction of these
nested subsystems continuously flows into each other. The graded process is not
limited to perception and cognition but also flows into action (e.g., Balota &
Abrams 1995; see Song & Nakayama, 2009; Spivey & Dale, 2006, for a review).
Even as early as 1908, Pillsbury noted, “There is no act of attention that in
unaccompanied by some motor process” (p.12). Moreover, Hommel, Musseler,
Aschersleben, and Prinz (2001) propose that perception and action planning are
“indistinguishable”. More recently, Caroso-Leite and Gorea (2009) suggested that
both perception and action planning have their genesis within a single processing
network and even go as far as to posit that motor movements are a more sensitive
measure than conscious perceptual identification. In fact, the decreased level of
perceptual sensitivity is well documented in attentional blink literature in that
even if a subject cannot report the identity of a secondary target presented within
a stream of distractors, it is processed enough to cause priming effects (Vachon &
Tremblay, 2006).
Therefore, in the tradition of Tipper, Howard, and Jackson (1997), action
dynamics explores the variability of response movements as they unfold in order
to elucidate the cognitive processes that enabled the movement. Within the novel
action dynamics methodology that we employ, participants respond to stimuli that
are presented within a continuous dual-task paradigm by pointing with a Nintendo
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Wii remote instead of arbitrary key presses to indicate responses, as is usually
done in typical dual-task experiments. This methodology provides a rich source of
arm-movement data that provides insights into the dynamics of cognitive
processing itself (Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey, 2007; Farmer, Cargill, Hindy, Dale, &
Spivey, 2007; Freeman, Ambady, Rule, & Johnson, 2008; Spivey, Grosjean, &
Knoblich, 2005).
The Present Study
The purpose of the present experiments is to “uncork” the bottleneck in
order to peer inside at the inner workings of the autonomously coordinated
cognitive processes that yield the behavioral regularities commonly referred to as
the bottleneck. The principle measures employed in typical investigations into
dual-task limitations (e.g., PRP) are reaction time and error rates, which only
provide data on the end result of information processing. For both of the studies in
this work, focus will be shifted to exploring the process itself by modifying the
typical PRP paradigm to produce a continuous dual-task experiment. The
paradigm is referred to as “continuous” because it continually records data as the
responses unfold, not just when the response is selected, reflecting the
progression of information processing and the competition experienced by the
cognitive system.
In the following, purely exploratory experiments, the primary question
being asked is centered on whether attention/cognitive control is best
characterized in terms of its structural limitations (i.e., bottleneck) or its flexible,
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dynamic properties. It is hypothesized that if information processing is a passive
first-come, first-served phenomenon, as the classic structural bottleneck theory
proposes, participants should always respond to the stimuli in the order they were
presented and the response trajectories should reveal direct movement to the
correct response option in a serial manner. However, if information processing is
an active process within which stimuli compete for processing resources as
proposed by coordination dynamics and Potter et al. (2002), the response
movements should reflect this by displaying deviations in the trajectories
modulated by the presentation of the second stimulus. In other words, the second
stimulus will “pull” on the responses as their progression is tracked, lending
support to an active, dynamic interaction among stimuli during processing.
A secondary point of interest radiates from a central coordination/action
dynamics prediction. That is, that the emerging systematic patterns within the
response trajectories may be indicative of particular structure(s) that the cognitive
system produces in order to process the information based on the unique
combination of experimental parameters. The patterns will be stable as long as the
experimental context remains uniform. Manipulating the experimental parameters
(e.g., stimuli salience, presentation duration, temporal proximity, etc.) would
require the cognitive system to construct different processing structures resulting
in differing response trajectory patterns. Furthermore, because information
processing is situated within ever-changing environmental contexts (e.g., one
cannot step into the same river twice), the response trajectory patterns should
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adjust, and perhaps even adapt, to the experimental contexts. In other words, the
systematic trajectory patterns should be consistent for each of the experiments
(e.g., responses to trails that consist of the shortest SOA should be approximately
tantamount in each experiment, providing that memory, perceptual load, etc.
remains the same). However, the time course of these patterns may flexibly adjust
to the individual experimental contexts. For example, SOAs in one experiment
could be 150, 500, and 999 ms and in a second experiment the SOAs could be 30,
100, and 200 ms. Trajectories of trials that include the shortest SOAs of each
experiment (150 ms and 30 ms) should be similar even though the time course
may differ.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1
The first experiment investigates whether a subsequently presented
stimulus is capable of pulling processing resources away from a previously
presented one, as predicted by the Potter et al. (2002) model, while using SOAs
that are commonly used in PRP experiments.
Methods
Subjects
Participants included 19 (15 females, mean age 20.5) University of Memphis
undergraduates from the psychology subject pool who participated for extra credit
in their introductory psychology course that self-reported normal or corrected to
normal vision and hearing.
Interface Display and Device
The experiment took place in an oblong laboratory room (3.8 m x 61.8 m).
An Epson LCD projector and Apple Mac mini were placed on a small 76 cm high
table that stood approximately 2.7 m away from the long wall of the room. The
Mac mini’s display is projected onto the wall at the end of the room creating a
display approximately 1.4 m in width (29.1° visual angle). Participants interacted
with the experimental program by using the Nintendo Wii remote. Standing
behind the table, participants held the Wii remote in their right hand that was
approximately lined up with the projector’s lens. The Wii remote interfaces with
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the Apple mini computer via a Bluetooth transfer protocol called DarwiinRemote
(2006, Hiroaki Kimura). A Nyko infrared emitter at the base of the projected
screen provides the remote with a frame of reference so that arm movements are
mapped isomorphically onto x,y pixel-coordinate movements (see Figure 1).
MATLAB Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997) was used to develop the
experimental program, produce the tone stimuli, and sample the Wii remotecontrolled cursor movements as streaming x-y coordinates at approximately 80-90
Hz.

Figure 1. Experimental environment and interface. Participants stood in a
darkened room (not shown) and placed on a headset. They interacted with the
interface via a Nintendo Wii remote while their response trajectories were being
recorded.
Procedure
Stimuli. In the continuous dual-task paradigm, participants performed a
visual discrimination task (T1) and an auditory discrimination task (T2). For each
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trial, S1 was an image of a bug (2.4° visual angle) that varied in color from red to
blue (i.e., saliently red, ambiguously red, ambiguously blue, saliently blue). T1
was to determine whether the presented bug was more red than blue or vice versa.
Previously, 35 (30 females, mean age 19.8) University of Memphis
undergraduates who reported normal or corrected to normal vision participated in
a color norming task. Each bug stimulus was presented 6 times in random order
on a computer screen and the participants were asked to respond by determining
whether the bug was red or blue by typing response keys on the keyboard. Once
normed, the bug stimuli were used as S1 in the current study.
At varying SOAs (150, 500, 999 ms) after S1 is displayed, a tone (S2) was
played via headphones. There were four levels of tone pitch that varied between
low and high (300, 500, 700, 900Hz). T2 was to categorize the pitch of the tone as
high or low. The levels of saliency in the visual and auditory discrimination tasks
were manipulated in order to produce varying amounts of cognitive competition.
The task difficulty increases when ambiguous stimuli are presented, therefore it is
predicted that these trials will induce more competition within the cognitive
system. Whereas, categorizing the salient stimuli is expected to reduce cognitive
competition.
Task. At the beginning of each trial a central fixation point (2.7° visual
angle) and four response boxes (2.8° visual angle) were displayed on the screen.
Above and below the central fixation point were response boxes labeled “blue”
and “red” respectively. To the left and right of the central fixation point were

14

response boxes labeled “low” and “high” respectively (see Figure 2). To begin
each trial, participants clicked the central fixation point. At that time S1 replaced
the fixation point and then was followed by S2.

Figure 2. Feedback and the experimental interface. Response order was not set.
Participants could respond to either S1 or S2 first. (However, only trials when S1
was selected first were used in the analyses.) Accuracy feedback was displayed in
the form of a red “X” to indicate incorrect selections and green check marks
indicated correct responses. (No trials that included any incorrect response were
used in the analyses.)
In previous PRP studies, participants respond to each stimulus with
different hands (e.g., Jentzsch et al., 2007; Johnston & McCann, 2006; Ruthruff &
Pashler, 2001; see Pashler & Johnston, 1998, for a review). In the current
experiment, responses to both stimuli are conducted through the participants’ right
hand only. Requiring participants to respond to both stimuli through a single
response medium was expected to increase competition within the cognitive
system for that medium. Participants were instructed to respond by moving the
15

Wii remote-controlled cursor and clicking on the appropriate response boxes that
correspond to S1 and S2 as quickly and as accurately as possible. Participants
were not instructed to respond in the order the stimuli were presented but to
respond in the order of their perceptual decisions. Feedback within the
experimental interface was provided by the presentation of either a green check
mark (to indicate a correct response) or a red “X” (to indicate a wrong response)
in the selected response box. The trial ended once correct responses to both
stimuli were selected (see Figure 2).
The instructions were explained to each participant prior to an 8 trial
practice stage during which they were allowed to ask clarification questions about
the experimental procedures. The researcher then initiated the experiment and left
the room once the participant verbally acknowledged clear understanding of the
procedures. During each session, participants went through 5 blocks of 48 trails.
In each block every combination of bug color, tone pitch, and SOA was displayed
exactly once in random order. Participants completed 240 total trials that lasted
approximately 20 minutes.
Measures
The Wii remote is not fixed on a surface (as in computer-mouse studies,
Dale et al., 2007; Spivey et al., 2005). This causes constant subtle fluctuation in
the held-out hand. Therefore a pixel radius to define an “escape” region was used.
Previously, Dale, Roche, Snyder, McCall (2008) used a 100-pixel escape region.
However, for the smaller experimental display presented here it was found that a
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100-pixel escape region was too conservative and it was thus determined that a
50-pixel escape region would be more appropriate.
Basic Measures. Analyses for each experiment presented in this work are
separated and displayed in two tables. The first of which displays basic response
time measures. These measures include T1 latency, T1 reaction time, and T2
reaction time. A latency period for T1 was calculated in milliseconds from the
time the trial began until participant’s response movements exit the 50-pixel
escape region, producing T1 latency. How long it took for a response to unfold
over time serves as a second measure. T1 response time was measured from the
onset of S1 until a correct T1 response was selected. This reflects the amount of
time the hand is in motion towards a selection. T2 Response time was measured
from the T1 response selection (or presentation of S2, whichever came first) to the
selection of a correct T2 response. To analyze these dependent measures, a 3
(SOA) x 2 (bug: salient vs. ambiguous) x 2 (tone: salient vs. ambiguous) linear
mixed-effects model for each of the measures was conducted (using MIXED
procedure in SPSS, with subjects as a random factor). All trials involving any
incorrect response were removed prior to analysis. Unless otherwise noted, only
effects significant at the .05-level are reported. All other main effects and
interactions not mentioned are not significant.
Dynamic Measures. The second set of analyses that were conducted for
each experiment presented here analyzed the unfolding of the responses and are
grouped in tables titled x-axis deviation results. These analyses focused on
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measuring how variables such as SOA, bug color and tone pitch affected how
much the participant’s T1 response movements deviate along the x-axis. Since T1
responses required only vertical movements, deviations along the x-axis serve as a
measure of whether S2 affected T1 responses. For example, if the highest tone
(responded to towards the right response option) is presented before or during
movement, x-axis fluctuation towards the right may be observed. These x-axis
deviations during T1 responses were analyzed at 50 ms intervals after the
response trajectories exited the escape region. If the response movements
captured cognitive competition, then any x-coordinate deviation present in the
evolving trajectories should reflect the direction of the correct S2 response. To
analyze these dependent measures, we employed the use of 3 (SOA) x 2 (sound
type: high vs. low) linear mixed-effects models for each 50 ms interval, from 50
ms until 400 ms after S2 was presented (using MIXED procedure in SPSS, with
subjects as a random factor).
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS
Basic Response Time Measures
T1 latency was significantly reduced for saliently colored bugs by
approximately 37 ms. Similarly, RT1 and RT2 were significantly increased by
ambiguous stimuli by approximately 15 and 71 ms respectively. Also, lower
SOAs induced faster reaction times for both tasks by approximately 87 ms for T1
and 167 ms for T2. These findings are displayed in Table 1.

Table 1
Results of Basic Response Time Measures

DV

T1 Latency

T1 RT

T2 RT

Ambig.
Salient

M (ms), F
512, 32.2***
475

M (ms), F
1,312, 82***
1297

M (ms), F
705, 48.5***
634

1,271, 15.9***
1284
1358

608, 107.9***
625
775

150ms
500ms
999ms
*** p < .001.
Dynamic Measures

There was a significant main effect of sound type (i.e., whether S2 was a
high or low pitch tone) on the x-axis deviations in the T1 response trajectories
from 50 ms to 400 ms after S2 was presented, F(1, 8,180.4) = 4.0, p < .05. This
effect was stronger when the trials were divided by bug color and analyzed
19

separately. An additional outcome when analyzing the bug color subsets was that
there was a significant interaction between sound type and SOA. The significant
findings are listed in Table 2. Although not statistically significant when pooling
the bug color subsets, this interaction is plotted at 50 and 250 ms into the T1
response trajectory in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Mean x-axis deviation at 50 ms (top) and 250 ms (bottom) into T1
response trajectory for Experiment 1. Higher x-axis deviation reflects more
rightward movements (movements towards high-tone responses). Lower x-axis
deviations indicate more leftward trajectories (drifting toward the low-tone
responses).
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Table 2
X-axis Deviation Results
Blue S1 Trials
Time into Sound SOA Sound

Red S1 Trials
Sound SOA Sound

All Trials
Sound SOA (F)Sound

T1

Type

Type

Type

response

(F)

(ms)
50-400
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400

(F)

Type x

SOA (F) (F)

22.0***253.9*** 37.3***
5.9** 5.5**
13.2** 3.9*
28.7*** 4.0*
8.0** 49.4***
6.4** 51.5***
7.9** 47.0*** 3.7*
4.4* 34.3*** 4.5*
30.8*** 14.7***

(F)

Type x

Type x

SOA (F) (F)

55.3***24.0***34.0*** 4.0*
10.9***
12.3***
6.3**
5.1*
5.4*
16.0***10.0***5.4*
22.5***17.3***8.7**
15.3***26.2***8.0**

* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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3.7*
5.4*

SOA (F)

200.7***

19.4***
33.7***
47.1***
47.3***
54.2***

CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 1 DISCUSSION
The data from the current study are in line with previous investigations
showing that task difficulty is manifested in response trajectories (Dale et al.,
2008). Contrary to most PRP results, we found that as SOA decreased, RT1 and
RT2 also decreased. One explanation for this finding could be that participants
took as much time as they were allotted to process S1 and that the presentation of
S2 cued them to initiate a S1 response. Furthermore, this result is likely unique to
this experiment because T1 and T2 responses were collapsed into a single
medium, as opposed to responding to each task with separate hands as is typically
the case in classic PRP studies. Moreover, programming a single response in the
left hand and then another in the right hand may require more time than
programming two responses for one hand.
The findings of the x-axis deviation analysis show (relative) movement in
the direction of the correct response to S2 at the shortest SOA, but away from the
correct response at the longer SOAs. This occurs as soon as 50 ms into the T1
response movement. These results suggest that S2 is being processed very early
into the T1 response, and competing with it, resulting in a drift toward the correct
T2 response at the shortest SOA. The pull away from the correct T2 response at
longer SOAs may be indicative of active inhibition. Previous work by McSorley,
Haggard, and Walker (2006; see also Tipper et al., 1997, for manual trajectories)
has shown that saccade trajectories also show a similar pattern of deviation
22

toward a distractor when the saccade latency is less than 200 ms but the eyes
moved in the opposite direction when the latency is more than 200 ms, indicating
active inhibition.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT 2
The results of Experiment 1 seem to lend support to the notion that a
secondary stimulus can pull processing resources away from a previously
presented one, as the Potter et al. (2002) model proposed. This finding in turn
begins to suggest that perhaps cognitive control is better characterized by its
flexible, dynamic properties than its structural limitations. We conduct a second
experiment in order to investigate this possibility further. The data resulting from
the first experiment fall in line exactly with McSorley et al.’s (2006) findings.
However, it leaves the door open to more questions. Is the 200 ms mark,
separating attracted versus repulsed trajectories, particularly special? Is cognitive
control always subject to this seemingly structural time course? Or, does it adjust
to the experimental context? Experiment 2 uses SOAs that were reduced by
magnitude of 5 from Experiment 1, which more closely resembled those used by
Potter et al. (2002). If the 200 ms mark is in fact an innate structural limitation
then all of the T1 response trajectories should exhibit a pull toward the correct S2
response. However, If cognitive control dynamically adjusts, as coordination
dynamics proposes, then the pattern of the T1 response trajectories should mirror
those of Experiment 1, in that trajectories of the shortest SOA trials should be
attracted while trajectories of the two longer SOA trials should be repulsed even
thought they are all 200 ms or less.
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Method
Subjects
Participants included 19 (11 females, mean age 19.3) University of Memphis
undergraduates from the psychology subject pool who participated for extra credit
in their introductory psychology course that self-reported normal or corrected to
normal vision and hearing.
Procedure
Procedures for Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1 except that
the SOAs used were 30, 100, 200 ms. Measures and analyses were also the same
as Experiment 1.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS
Basic Response Time Measures
T1 latency was significantly reduced for saliently colored bugs by
approximately 16 ms. Similarly, RT1 and RT2 were significantly increased by
ambiguous stimuli by approximately 162 and 48 ms respectively. The previous
effect of SOA from Experiment 1 was not retained. These findings are displayed
in Table 3.

Table 3
Results of Basic Response Time Measures
DV

T1 Latency

T1 RT

T2 RT

Ambig.
Salient

M (ms), F
529, 4.5*
513

M (ms), F
1,401, 83.7***
1239

M (ms), F
667, 11.4***
619

* p < .05. *** p < .001.

Dynamic Measures
As in the first experiment, there was a significant main effect of sound
type (i.e., whether S2 was a high or low pitch tone) on the x-axis deviations in the
T1 response trajectories from 50 ms to 400 ms after S2 was presented, F(1,
9,166.7)= 31.7, p < .001. However, unlike Experiment 1, there was also a
significant interaction between sound type and SOA even before the trials were
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divided by bug color type. The significant findings are listed in Table 4 and the
interaction is plotted at 50 and 250 ms into the T1 response trajectory in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Mean x-axis deviation at 50 ms (top) and 250 ms (bottom) into T1
response trajectory for Experiment 2.
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Table 4
X-axis Deviation Results
Blue S1 Trials
Time into Sound SOA Sound

Red S1 Trials
Sound SOA Sound

All Trials
Sound SOA (F)Sound

T1

Type

Type

Type

response

(F)

(ms)
50-400
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400

(F)

Type x

SOA (F) (F)

(F)

Type x

SOA (F) (F)

23.3***251.4***
14.4***264.0*** 10.2***
97.4*** 17.3***
69.5***
77.1*** 11.1**
37.9***
75.7*** 9.4**
50.9***
61.0***
51.7***
43.0***
52.1***
7.1** 33.6***
36.5***
8.4** 21.8***
3.6* 40.2***
10.2** 23.5***
11.9*** 26.0***

* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Type x
SOA (F)

31.7*** 513.1*** 7.7**
166.7*** 15.6***
110.6***6.8**
124.8*** 5.6**
113.0***
96.0***
6.5** 70.2***
11.1***59.9***
21.3*** 48.5***

CHAPTER 7
EXPERIMENT 2 DISCUSSION
The effects of SOA in the response time findings of Experiment 1 were not
replicated in Experiment 2. This is presumably due to that fact that the shortened
SOAs of Experiment 2 did not allow participants the luxury of extra processing,
or cognitive slack, time.
In Experiment 1, inhibition was not evident in trials with the 150 ms SOA.
Interestingly, in Experiment 2 inhibition of the T2 response was observed in trials
with the 100 ms SOA. Although the time course of inhibition is not consistent, in
both experiments the shortest SOA yielded a pull toward the distracting S2 while
the longer SOAs seemed to indicate active inhibition. This pattern provides more
evidence supporting the coordination dynamics approach to cognitive control.
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CHAPTER 8
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The primary question of this work was: Is attention/cognitive control best
characterized in terms of its structural limitations (i.e., bottleneck) or its flexible,
dynamic properties? The subject is considered from the viewpoint that perception,
cognitive operations, and bodily movement are all part of a complex dynamical
system. Additionally, this perspective is used to facilitate a more in-depth peek
into the “black box” during dual-task information processing. By analyzing the
action-dynamics data provided in both experiments, scrutinizing how the response
unfolds in real-time provided evidence that the cognitive system does actively
adjust to changing experimental contexts. This finding falls in line with
neurophysiological evidence that processing limitations may not be due to a strict,
structural bottleneck that occurs at a predetermined point in information
processing. Instead, even if a common underlying neural substrate is responsible
for information-processing bottleneck(s), an “adaptive coding mechanism” is
responsible for aligning task-specific, stimulus-response mappings yielding
flexible limitations that could occur in perceptual and/or response stages of
processing (Ivanoff, Branning, & Marois, 2009).
Context and Cognitive Control
The secondary question addressed in this work was: Are there any
emerging patterns in the response trajectories that may be indicative of the
cognitive system adjusting to conform to the unique combination of experimental
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parameters. Results from both experiments lent support to the notion that
characterizing the cognitive system in terms of its dynamic flexibility is perhaps
doing it more justice than focusing on its limitations, because a specific time
course required for inhibition to emerge was not seen. Moreover, changing the
SOAs within the experimental contexts modulated when the cognitive system
experienced competition and inhibition. This finding demonstrated that the
cognitive system takes into consideration the relative speed of stimulus
presentation and flexibly adapts so that it is able to temporarily inhibit
subsequently presented stimuli while a previous stimulus is being tended to. That
is, instead of there being an inherent structure by which attention is directed
resulting in fixed amounts of processing time based on task difficulty, attention
adapts to the trial context by adjusting the way information is processed by
creating new “structures” for each experience. Essentially, coming to a decision
reflects a nonlinear process by which instability of the components within the
cognitive system is temporarily stabilized by the coming together of those
components (Johnson, Spencer, & Schöner 2008). Therefore, an attractive
explanation of the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 is that when presented with the
specific combination of context, current goal, and working memory load the
cognitive system adapts in a consistent fashion. This allows T1 response
movements in the shortest SOA trials in both experiments to be pulled toward the
correct S2 response while the trajectories of trials with longer SOAs demonstrate
inhibition. Evaluating cognitive control for processing rapidly presented
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information is essential for understanding how attention adapts to context.
Crucially, “rapidness” within the cognitive system is relative to trial context. In
other words, the length of time it takes for the assorted networks within the
cognitive system to organize themselves into an appropriate processing structure
is not set in stone.
Conclusion
The experiments presented here are not without limitations. It is possible
that the extent to which the stimuli compete with each other may be reduced
because in both experiments S1 will be a constant stimulus but S2 is presented
only briefly. While this is characteristic of most dual-task experimental designs,
adjusting the presentation duration of S1 to reflect that of S2 may enhance
competition among the stimuli in future studies. This adjustment may change the
trajectory patterns because working memory will be taxed, which may cause a
delay in the inhibition of the S2 response. Another limitation is that participants
might have been able to make ballistic-like responses because target regions may
have been large enough to accommodate speed over placement accuracy. In
future studies, reducing the size of the response boxes may provide more finegrained action dynamics data.
Despite the limitations, these exploratory studies have lent support to the
position that the behavioral regularities, which have historically been attributed to
the cognitive bottleneck, are less structural limitations and more an emergent
quality of the cognitive system. As with most things in nature, interactions among
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the smallest of particles (i.e., molecules, atoms) initiate chain reactions, which
yield the bewildering complexity of intelligent life (Kelso, 2002). In the same
way, the cognitive system organizes itself to process information as efficiently as
possible based on the current context. It is important to note that we propose that a
serial, discrete-stage-like structure does not define the cognitive system but is
self-imposed as the result of various factors being coordinated within a certain
context. The structure may dissolve at anytime if certain factors change, causing
the cognitive system to re-organize itself to better fit the new situation (Van Orden
et al., 2003). Moreover, talk of supporting one theory over another may be a
scientific oversimplification, when another conceptual strategy is quite possible:
serial, discrete-stage theories and coordination dynamics may be integrated by
identifying the contexts within which each holds, granting a pluralistic approach
to executive control (cf. Dale, 2008; Navon & Miller, 2002). This work is a first
step towards unveiling the basic processes that may give way to a bottleneck from
a perspective that is often seen as precluding it.
These exploratory studies investigated general issues of how the cognitive
system is best “characterized”, which spawn more explicit questions regarding the
“nuts and bolts” of the system. The task instructions did not specify response
order, rather participants where encouraged to respond in the order of their
perceptual decisions. Although, only correct trials in which participants responded
to S1 first and S2 second were analyzed, there were trials that demonstrated the
reverse response order. Future studies should explore what factors contribute to
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how the cognitive system determines the order in which information is processed?
What strategies are used to decide the most efficient way to process incoming
stimuli? Under what conditions are these strategies most efficient?
Finally, driving is an oft-used example in dual-tasking literature, but
usually it demonstrates limitations. I would like to shine a different light on the
comparison. In essence, the cognitive system can be compared to your car on the
interstate. Typically, the speed limit is approximately 65 mph and so the most
efficient way to drive in normal conditions is to set your speed control to 65.
However, if the road conditions change, if the car in front of you speeds up a bit
or slows down, you can tap the accelerate or coast buttons in order to adjust the
momentum. It may be that the human cognitive system behaves in such a way. If
driving on an unfamiliar road, you may drive slower; if following directions to a
place you’ve never been before, then you deal with each street sign as it comes
(e.g., operate in a more serial, discrete manner). On the other hand, if the traffic
around you is going faster than usual and you are moderately familiar with the
route then you speed up, adjusting to the speed of traffic; if you are driving an
extremely familiar route then you can rather successfully multi-task. It all depends
on the context within which you are operating.
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